Abstract. Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [9] recently presented an efficient mix-net, which they claim to be both robust and secure. We present five practical attacks for their mix-net, and break both its privacy and robustness. The first attack breaks the privacy of any given sender without corrupting any mix-server. The second attack requires that the first mix-server is corrupted. Both attacks are adaptations of the "relation attack" introduced by Pfitzmann [24, 23] . The third attack is similar to the attack of Desmedt and Kurusawa [4] and breaks the privacy of all senders. It requires that all senders are honest and that the last mix-server is corrupted. The fourth attack may be viewed as a novel combination of the ideas of Lim and Lee [16] and Pfitzmann [24, 23] . It breaks the privacy of any given sender, and requires that the first and last mix-servers are corrupted. This attack breaks also Jakobsson [14], including the fixed version of Mitomo and Kurosawa [18] . The fifth attack breaks the robustness in a novel way. It requires corruption of some senders and the first mix-server. This attack breaks also Jakobsson and Juels [15] .
Introduction
The notion of a mix-net was invented by Chaum [3] and further developed by a number of people. Properly constructed a mix-net enables a set of senders to send messages anonymously.
Informally the requirements on a mix-net are: correctness, privacy, robustness, availability, and efficiency. Correctness implies that the result is correct given that all mix-servers are honest. Privacy implies that if a fixed minimum number of mix-servers are honest privacy of the sender of a message is ensured. Robustness implies that if a fixed number of mix-servers are honest, then any attempt to cheat is detected and defeated.
A mix-net consists of a number of mix-servers that collectively execute a protocol. The idea is that each mix-server receives a list of encrypted messages, transforms them, using partial decryption or random re-encryption, reorders them, and then outputs the randomly transformed and reordered list of cleartext messages. The secret permutation is shared among the mix-servers.
Review of "Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls"
We present a short review of the relevant parts of the protocol of Golle et al. [9] . The description given here is as close as possible to the original, but we avoid details irrelevant to our attacks and change some notation to simplify the exposition of the attacks. For details we refer the reader to [9] .
Participants and Setup
The protocol assumes the existence of a bulletin board on which each participant has a dedicated area on which only she can write. No participant can erase anything on the bulletin board, but all participants can read everything.
The participants of the protocol are N senders, and a relatively small number of mix-servers, M 1 , . . . , M k . Each sender encrypts its message, and writes it on the bulletin board. The mix-servers then execute the mix-net protocol.
The protocol employs an El Gamal [5] cryptosystem in a subgroup G Q of prime order Q of the multiplicative group modulo a prime P , i.e. Z random. The corresponding public key is (g, y) , where g is a generator of G Q , and y = g x . Encryption of a message m ∈ G Q using the public key (g, y) is given by E (g,y) (m, r) = (g r , y r m), where r is chosen uniformly at random from Z Q , and decryption of a cryptotext on the form (u, v) = (g r , y r m) using the private key x is given by D x (u, v) = u −x v = m. The El Gamal system also has the re-encryptability 1 property, i.e. given (u, v) and the public key (g, y), anybody can "update" the randomness used in the encryption of m, by forming (g r u, y r v) = (g r+r , y r+r m) = E (g,y) (m, r + r ). In the setup stage each mix-server M j is somehow given a random x j ∈ Z Q , and y l = g x l for l = j. The value x j is also shared with the other mixservers using a threshold verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme 2 . Thus, if any mix-server M j is deemed to be cheating the other mix-servers can verifiably reconstruct its private key x j . The mix-servers can also compute y = k j=1 y j , which gives a joint public key (g, y), with secret corresponding private key x = k j=1 x j . A practical advantage of the mix-net is that it can be used to execute several mix-sessions using the same set of keys, i.e. the El Gamal keys are not changed between mix-sessions. To be able to do this the proofs of knowledge below are bound to a mix-session identifier id that is unique to the current mix-session.
Sending a Message to the Mix-Net
A typical honest sender, Alice, computes the following to send a message m to the mix-net:
where h : {0, 1} * → G Q is a hash function modeled by a random oracle. Then Alice computes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π id (u, v, w) , in the random oracle model of u, v and w, which depends on the current mix-session identifier id. Finally Alice writes (α, π id (u, v, w)) on the bulletin board.
Execution of the Mix-Net
First the mix-servers remove any duplicate inputs to the mix-net, and discard input tuples that contain components not in the subgroup G Q . Then the mixservers discard all input tuples where the proof of knowledge is not valid for the current mix-session.
be the resulting list of triples of El Gamal pairs. The mixing then proceeds in the following stages.
First Stage: Re-randomization and Mixing. This step proceeds as in all re-randomization mix-nets based on El Gamal. One by one, the mix-servers M 1 , . . . , M k randomize all the inputs and their order. (Note that the components of triples are not separated from each other during the re-randomization.) In addition, each mix-net must give a proof that the product of the plaintexts of all its inputs equals the product of the plaintexts of all its outputs. The protocol proceeds as follows.
1. Each mix-server M j reads from the bulletin board the list L j−1 output by the previous mix-server. 2. The mix-server then chooses r ji , s ji , t ji ∈ Z Q , for i = 1, . . . , N, randomly and computes the re-randomized list:
The above list of triples is then randomly permuted, and the resulting list:
is written on the bulletin board. 3. Define a j = N i=1 a j,i , and define b j , c j , d j , e j , and f j correspondingly. The mix-server proves in zero-knowledge that
, and similarly for the pairs (c j , d j ) and (e j , f j ), i.e. the component-wise product of the inner triples remains unchanged by the mix-server.
r ji , and M j knows the latter sum, the proof in Step 3) can be implemented by a standard zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the random oracle model, and similarly for the pairs (c j , d j ), and (e j , f j ). Such proofs are similar to Schnorr signatures [26] .
Second Stage: Decryption of the Inputs.
A quorum of mix-servers jointly decrypt each triple of ciphertexts in
. Since the method used to do this is irrelevant to our attacks, we do not present it here.
All triples for which w
Invalid triples are investigated according to the procedure described below.
If the investigation proves that all invalid triples are benign (only senders cheated), we proceed to Step 4. Otherwise, the decryption is aborted, and we continue with the back-up mixing. 4. A quorum of mix-servers jointly decrypt the ciphertexts (u i , v i ) for all valid triples. This successfully concludes the mixing. The final output is defined as the set of plaintexts corresponding to valid triples.
Special
Step: Investigation of Invalid Triples. The mix-servers must reveal the path of each invalid triple through the various permutations. For each invalid triple, starting from the last server, each server reveals which of its inputs corresponds to this triple, and how it re-randomized this triple. One of two things may happen:
-Benign case (only senders cheated): if the mix-servers successfully produce all such paths, the invalid triples are known to have been submitted by users. The decryption resumes after the invalid triples have been discarded. -Serious case (one or more servers cheated): if one or more servers fail to recreate the paths of invalid triples, these mix-servers are accused of cheating and replaced, and the mix-net terminates producing no output. In this case, the inputs are handed over to the back-up mixing procedure below.
Back-Up Mixing. The outer-layer encryption of the inputs posted to the mixnet is decrypted by a quorum of mix-servers. The resulting list of inner-layer ciphertexts becomes the input to a standard re-encryption mix-net based on El Gamal (using, for example Neff's scheme described in [19] ). Then the output of the standard mix-net is given as output by the mix-net.
Remark 2. It is impossible to find two lists
, if the product is interpreted in a group where the discrete logarithm problem is hard. This is stated as a theorem by Wagner 3 [28] , and appears as a lemma in Golle et al. [9] . During the re-encryption and mixing stage each mix-server proves in zeroknowledge that it leaves the component-wise product ( u i , v i , w i ), of the inner triples (u i , v i , w i ) unchanged, but individual triples may still be corrupted. Then invalid triples are traced back. This leaves only valid inner triples in the output and the proofs of knowledge of each server are used to conclude that the component-wise product of these valid inner triples was left unchanged by the mix-net. Golle et al. [9] then refer to the lemma and conclude that the set of valid triples in the output is identical to the set of valid triples hidden in the double encrypted input to the mix-net.
Unfortunately, this intuitively appealing construction is flawed as we explain in Section 3.5. Furthermore, our third attack in Section 3.3 shows that it is possible to cheat without changing the set of inner triples.
The Attacks
The goal of the adversary Eve is to break the privacy of our typical honest sender Alice and cheat without detection. Each of our attacks illustrates a separate weakness of the protocol. The first two attacks are adaptations of the "relation attack", introduced by Pfitzmann [24, 23] , to the setting with double enveloping. The idea of the "relation attack" is that to break the privacy of Alice, Eve computes a cryptotext of a message related to Alice's message. Then the mixnet is run as usual. The output of the mix-net contains two messages related in a way chosen by Eve. Some relations enable Eve to determine the message sent by Alice. The third attack is similar to the attack of Desmedt and Kurosawa [4] in that it exploits intermediate results of the protocol and fools a "product test". The fourth attack may be viewed as a novel combination of the ideas of Lim and Lee [16] and Pfitzmann [24, 23] . The fifth attack is novel.
First Attack: Honest Mix-Servers
We show that the adversary Eve can break the privacy of the typical sender Alice. All that is required is that Eve can send two messages to the mix-net, which is a natural assumption in most scenarios. In the following we use the notation for the cryptotext of Alice introduced in Section 2.2. Eve does the following:
1. Eve chooses δ and γ randomly in Z Q , and computes:
, that she sends to the bulletin board (possibly by corrupting two senders). 2. Eve waits until the mix-net has successfully completed its execution. During the execution of the mix-net the mix-servers first jointly decrypt the "outer layer" of the double encrypted messages. After benign tuples have been removed the result is a list of valid triples
The final output of the mix-net is the result of decrypting each inner El (1) such that z = u l . Finally she concludes that with very high probability m l was the message sent by Alice to the mix-net.
Remark 3. At additional computational cost it suffices for Eve to send 2 messages to break the privacy of K senders. Suppose Eve wants to break the privacy also of Bob who sent m encrypted as (
Eve performs the attack above with the change that she starts with a single pair (µ ζ 1 µ 1 , µ ζ 2 µ 2 ) for some randomly chosen ζ instead of the two distinct pairs (µ 1 , µ 2 ), and (µ 1 , µ 2 ) that would have given two "unrelated" attacks. The original third step of the attack first gives Eve z = u ζ u . To finish the attack she finds a pair (l, l ) such that u ζ l u l = z, and concludes that with high probability Alice sent m l and Bob sent m l . The approach is generalized to higher dimensions in the natural way to break the privacy of several senders (K must clearly be reasonably sized).
Why the Attack Is Possible. The attack exploits two different flaws of the protocol. The first is that the sender of a message, e.g. Alice, proves only knowledge of the inner El Gamal pair (u, v) and the hash value w = h(u, v), and not knowledge of the message m. The second flaw is that identical El Gamal keys are used for both the inner and outer El Gamal system. Anybody can compute a single encrypted message (µ 
Second Attack: Different Keys and Corrupt Mix-Server
Suppose we change the protocol slightly by requiring that the mix-servers generate separate keys for the outer and inner El Gamal systems, to avoid the first attack of Section 3.1. We assume that there are two different key pairs ((g, y in ), x in ) and ((g, y out ), x out ), for the inner and outer El Gamal layers respectively. We also assume that these keys have been shared similarly as the original key pair ((g, y), x) . This is the type of double enveloping proposed by Wikström [29] . For the second attack to succeed we need some additional assumptions.
Unclear Details and Additional Assumptions. We start by quoting Section 5, under "Setup." point 4 of Golle et al. [9] , which presents the proof of knowledge π id (u, v, w) of the sender Alice:
4. This proof of knowledge should be bound to a unique mix-session identifier to achieve security over multiple invocations of the mix. Any user who fails to give the proof is disqualified, and the corresponding input is discarded.
If different keys are used for each mix-session, then the above makes no sense, since the proof of knowledge of u, v and w already depends on the public key of the outer El Gamal system. There is clearly practical value in not changing keys between mix-sessions. We assume that the keys are not changed between mixsessions even if a mix-server is found to be cheating. If a mix-server is found to be cheating, its shared keys are instead reconstructed by the remaining mix-servers using the VSS-scheme, and in later mix-sessions the actions of the cheating mixserver are performed in the open (the details of this does not matter to our attack). Under these assumptions we can give an attack on the protocol.
The original paper of Golle et al. [9] does not explicitly say if the discovery of the corrupted mix-server results in a new execution of the key generation protocol. Apparently the intention of the authors is to let the remaining mixservers generate a new set of keys if any cheating is discovered [10] .
The attack is interesting even though this interpretation is not the one intended by the authors, since it shows the importance of explicitly defining all details of protocols and highlights some issues with running several concurrent mix-sessions using the same set of keys.
The Attack. Apart from the above assumptions, the attack only requires that the first mix-server in the mix-chain is corrupted. The attack is employed during two mix-sessions using the same keys and the corrupted mix-server is identified as a cheater in the first mix-session. In the following we describe the actions of Eve during the first and second mix-sessions, respectively.
The First Mix-Session. We assume that Alice and some other arbitrary sender Bob have sent inputs to the mix-net (and use the notation of Remark 3 for the input of Bob). Eve corrupts M 1 . It then replaces α and α with: [E yout (u), E yout (v), E yout (w )], and [E yout (u ), E yout (v ), E yout (w)] respectively, in its input list, i.e. the third components of the two triples are shifted. Then Eve forces M 1 to simulate a completely honest mix-server on the resulting altered list At the end of the mixing the mix-servers verify the tuples and discover the invalid tuples (u, v, w ) and (u , v , w). These tuples are traced back all the way to the first mix-server, which is revealed as a cheater. In this process Eve is able to link Alice to (u, v) (and Bob to (u , v )). Finally the honest mix-servers finish the protocol by using the general constructions based on the work by Neff [19] as in Golle et al. [9] .
The Second Mix-Session. To allow the mix-net to execute a second mixsession using the same set of keys, the cheater's key is reconstructed and revealed by a quorum of the mix-servers.
To determine the contents of the El Gamal pair (u, v), Eve waits for the second mix-session using the same set of keys. Then she uses a "relation attack" [24, 23, 12] in the second mix-session to decrypt (u, v), i.e. Eve does the following:
, and 
, which she sends to the bulletin board (possibly by corrupting two senders). 
Remark 4.
The attack is easily generalized to break the privacy of several senders by using a circular shift of the third components during the first mix-session. It is also easy to see that Remark 3 can be applied to reduce the number of messages sent by Eve during the second mix-session.
Why the Attack Is Possible. The attack exploits that the sender of a message only proves knowledge of the inner triple (u, v, w) . At the cost of detected cheating Eve finds a (u, v) corresponding to Alice, and then uses the second mix-session as a decryption oracle to get her hands on m.
A Note on Concurrent Mix-Sessions. Ignoring the other attacks, a simple countermeasure to the second attack above, is to stipulate that if a cheating mix-server is identified new keys must be generated for the next mix-session.
A disadvantage of this countermeasure is that the mix-net can not be allowed to execute several concurrent mix-sessions using the same keys. If one mix-session is still receiving messages while another mix-session discovers a cheating mixserver the second attack of Section 3.2 can still be applied. The problem is not solved by running the back-up mix-net of Neff [19] on all mix-sessions using the same keys at this point.
This problem of concurrency may seem academic, since in most election scenarios it is not very cumbersome to have different keys for each mix-session, but in future applications of mix-nets it may be useful to run several concurrent mix-sessions using the same keys.
Third Attack: Honest Senders and One Corrupt Mix-Servers
In this section we assume that all senders and all mix-servers, except the last mix-server M k , are honest. The last mix-server M k is corrupted by the adversary Eve and performs the attack. The attack breaks both robustness and privacy.
To simplify our notation we write
for the input list, where we define it instead simulates the actions of an honest mix-server on the corrupted input L k−1 . The output list written to the bulletin board by the simulated mix-server is denoted L k .
4. Eve waits until the inner layer has been decrypted and uses her knowledge of the permutation that relates L k to L 0 to break the privacy of all senders.
We show that the attack goes undetected, i.e. the mix-servers decrypt the inner layer. This implies that the attack succeeds. Firstly, consider the proof of knowledge that M k produces during the reencryption and mixing stage. Define a k−1 = (a a 0,1 )   N   i=2 a 0,i , and similarly  for for b k−1 , c k−1 , d k−1 , e k−1 , and f k−1 . In Step 3 above, the simulated honest mix-server outputs proofs of knowledge of the logarithms: and similarly for b k−1 , c k−1 , d k−1 , e k−1 , and f k−1 . This implies that the proof of knowledge produced by M k is deemed valid by the other mix-servers.
Secondly, consider the investigation of invalid inner triples. Tracing back invalid triples is difficult to M k , since it does not know the re-encryption exponents and the permutation relating L k−1 and L k . We show that there are no invalid inner triples. Suppose we define the sums r =
we form the sum of all re-encryption exponents used by all mix-servers except the last, for the first second and third El Gamal pairs respectively. Since all mix-servers except M k are honest, we have (a , b , c , d , e , f ) = (g r , y r , g s , y s , g t , y t ), which implies that α 1 is a valid re-encryption of α 1 . Thus M k does not corrupt any inner triple by simulating an honest mix-server on the input L k−1 . Since all senders are honest and the set of inner triples hidden in L 0 and L k−1 are identical, there are no invalid inner triples. Thus cheating is not detected and robustness is broken.
We conclude that the mix-servers decrypt the inner triples, i.e. the privacy of all senders is broken.
Why the Attack Is Possible. The third attack above exploits that the last mix-server M k is not forced to take the output L k−1 of the next to last mixserver as input. This allows M k to use a slightly modified version of L 0 instead, which breaks the privacy of all senders.
Fourth Attack: Two Corrupt Mix-Servers
In this section we assume that the first and last mix-servers, M 1 and M k , are corrupted. We give a novel attack that breaks the privacy of any given sender Alice.
Without loss we let α 1 and α 2 be the tuples sent by Alice and Bob respectively. Let ξ ∈ Z * P \G Q . Eve corrupts M 1 and M k , and they proceed as follows.
1. M 1 computes the elements α 1 = [(ξa 0,1 , b 0,1 ), (c 0,1 , d 0,1 ), (e 0,1 , f 0,1 )] and
, (e 0,2 , f 0,2 )], and forms the modified list
, where
Then it computes the tuples . . . , β l−1 , β l , β l+1 , . . . , β l −1 , β l , β l +1 , . . . , β N }, on the bulletin board.  3. The mix-net outputs (m 1 , . . . , m N ) and Eve concludes that Alice sent m l .
Since all mix-servers except M 1 and M k are honest there exists l, l ∈ {1, . . . , N} and r, r ∈ Z Q such that a k,l = g r ξa 0,1 and 
Similarly as in the second attack of Section 3.3, we conclude that the proofs of knowledge produced by M 1 and M k are deemed valid by the other mix-servers. If we assume that Alice and Bob are honest, their inner triples are never traced back and cheating is not detected.
If ξ = ξ −1 Eve can only conclude that Alice sent a message from the set {m l , m l }. This breaks the privacy of Alice, but Eve can also identify Alice's message uniquely by choosing Bob to be a corrupted sender.
Remark 5. Our attack may be viewed as a novel combination of the ideas in Lim and Lee [16] and Pfitzmann [24, 23] in that we use elements in Z * P \G Q to execute a "relation attack". However, Lim and Lee [16] focus on extracting the secret key, and their attack requires that P − 1 contains a relatively large smooth factor. Their proposed countermeasure is to choose P such that (P − 1)/2 consists of large prime factors. This implies that the protocol leaks at most one bit. Our attack on the other hand use elements of Z * P \G Q more subtly, and is applicable 4 and practical for any choice of P . In particular the type of P proposed by Lim and Lee.
Why the Attack Is Possible. The attack exploits that a mix-server M j does not verify that all elements in its input L j−1 are in G Q . M 1 uses this to "tag" elements in L 0 , which lets them be identified by the last mix-server M k .
Fifth Attack: One Corrupt Mix-Server
In Proposition 3 of Golle et al. [9] the authors claim that their protocol satisfies the following strong definition of public verifiability if there is a group G Q in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. Definition 1. (Public Verifiability (cf. [9] )) A mix net is public verifable if there exists a polynomially bounded verifier that takes as input the transcript of the mixing posted on the bulletin board, outputs "valid" if the set of valid outputs is a permuted decryption of all valid inputs, and otherwise outputs "invalid" with overwhelming probability. Note that to prove public verifiability, we consider an adversary that can control all mix-servers and all users. Unfortunately, Proposition 3 of [9] is false. This is seen as follows.
Suppose that there are 4 senders, and that the adversary corrupts two of the senders and the first mix-server M 1 . We conclude that the sets of valid inner triples in the input and output respectively differ, public verifiability is broken, and Proposition 3 of [9] is false.
Some may argue that this is not important since the adversary may only choose to correct invalid messages which she has previously prepared for this particular purpose. However, note that the adversary may choose whether to correct α 3 and α 4 . If she chooses not to correct invalid triples they are simply traced back and considered benign.
The following application shows the importance of this subtlety. We use the mix-net construction to run two independent elections (using different keys). First all votes for both elections are collected, and after some time both elections are closed. Then the mix-net is executed for the first election. Finally the mixnet is executed for the second election. In this scenario the adversary can insert specially prepared invalid triples (i.e. votes) in the second election, and then decide whether to correct these triples based on the outcome of the first election. This should clearly not be allowed, but may be acceptable in certain non-voting scenarios.
Why the Attack Is Possible. The attack exploits the fact that the first mixserver can choose whether to correct specially prepared invalid inner triples or not without detection.
Further Applications and Future Work
The attacks of sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 all exploit the particular structure of the protocol of Golle et al. [9] . We have found no other protocol vulnerable to these attacks. In particular the protocol by Jakobsson [14] with similar structure is not vulnerable to the attack of Section 3.2.
The attack of Section 3.4 can be applied to break the privacy of Jakobsson [14] , including the fixed protocol 5 Mitomo and Kurosawa [18] , and the attack of Section 3.5 breaks the robustness of Jakobsson and Juels [15] . These attacks are sketched in Appendices A and B.
An interesting open question is what other protocols are vulnerable to attacks based on malicious use of elements in Z * P \G Q .
Conclusion
We have presented several practical attacks for the mix-net recently proposed by Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [9] , claimed secure by the authors. In particular we break privacy of any sender without corrupting any mix-server. Two of our attacks are easily adapted to break Jakobsson [14] , including the Mitomo and Kurosawa [18] variant, and Jakobsson and Juels [15] .
The attacks for mix-nets, presented here and in other papers [23, 23, 17, 4, 18] , suggest that we should be careful with unproven claims of security for mix-nets.
B Attack for "An Optimally Robust Hybrid Mix Network"
Jakobsson and Juels [15] presents a hybrid mix-net. We assume familiarity with their protocol and sketch how it is broken using the attack of Section 3.5.
Suppose that there are four senders, and that the i:th sender forms a cryptotext (c 
0 for some a = 1.
The adversary corrupts M 1 . M 1 then replaces y (4) 0 . The VerifyComplaint procedure is never invoked, since all cryptotexts are valid. Thus the cheating is not detected.
We conclude that the set of cleartext messages corresponding to the set of valid cryptotexts in the input differs from the set of cleartext messages in the output of the mix-net. This breaks the robustness, i.e. Definition 4(b).
